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ABSTRACT
Nowadays, more and more airlines have adopted various alliance strategies, such as code sharing, equity sharing, merging
and acquisition to survive in the rigorously competitive market.
To assess the effectiveness of code sharing and merging practices among airlines, we include major factors affecting the
decisions of code sharing and merging into our model and
propose the formulation and calibration procedures of payoff
functions under various airline coalition scenarios. In the case
study, we apply TOPSIS to assess the importance of factors in
the decision making of code sharing and merging and to create a
priority ranking of target airlines in the cooperative games. In
conclusion, we found that financial stability and profitability
are the top two factors affecting merging decision while profitability is the only concern in the code sharing games. In
addition, we found that Taiwan’s domestic airlines would gain
more profits through merging rather than code sharing while
EVA and CAL could be the best target for merging.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the deregulation of air travel market in Taiwan in 1987,
the number of domestic airlines has increased from four to nine.
The flight frequency between Taipei and other major cities grew
so quickly that the domestic airport in Taipei has become one of
the busiest airports in Asia. Consequently, travelers enjoyed
the benefits of low airfare and high flight frequency resulted
from deregulation
Unfortunately, cut-throat competition among airlines had led
to bankruptcy of some airlines and the rising concerns of air
safety in the public. To strengthen air travel safety and enhance the competitiveness of domestic airlines, Taiwan’s Civil
Aviation Bureau (TCAB) released new regulations in 1999
offering incentives for merging among airlines and penalties for
Paper submitted 03/01/06; accepted 02/02/07. Author for correspondence:
Oliver F. Shyr (ofshyr@mail.ncku.edu.tw).
* Department of Urban Planning, National Cheng Kung University, Tainan,
Taiwan.
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those who refused to comply. After a series of merging and
acquisitions among airlines, the number of airlines has decreased from nine to six and the cutthroat competition among
domestic airlines has come to an end. In the past few years,
numerous cases of merging and acquisition among international
airlines have been applied to deal with airline bankruptcy. On
the other hand, although airline merging is one of the policies
promoted by Taiwan aviation authority, little progress has been
made after 2000. Taiwan’s domestic airlines are more interested in code sharing than merging because the decision regarding merging is much more complicated than the decision
regarding code sharing.
According to our survey of
higher-ranked managers from various airlines, profitability is
the primary factor affecting decisions regarding airline code
sharing. However, the major factors affecting the decisions
regarding airline merging or acquisitions include: 1) the performance of profitability; 2) the financial creditability and stability; 3) the extension of service network; 4) the compatibility
of maintenance and logistic systems; and 5) the coordination of
human resources. As a result, merging was seldom proposed
by domestic airlines and did not draw serious attention to the
business unless code sharing was ineffective and the financial
condition was further deteriorated. Recently, the issues of
airline merging has been raised due to a series of incidents －
terrorists’ attacks on September 11, 2001 targeted on US, a
severe China Airline’s accident in 2002, and the outbreak of
SARS in 2003. During this period, most of Taiwan’s airlines
have suffered great loss in revenue and patronages for both
domestic and international markets. To assess the potential
benefits and to find good candidates of merging or acquisitions
are now become serious issues for domestic airline managers.
In this study, we first estimate coalition effectiveness by
cooperative game approach. Next, we apply multi-criteria
decision method, i.e., the Technique for Order Preference by
Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) developed by Hwang and
Yoon [6], to incorporate these factors and provide a priority
ranking of target airlines in the practices of code sharing and
merging games.
Numerous papers had dealt with airline cooperation issues.
Carlton et al. [3] compared the benefits and costs before and
after the merging of North Central Airlines and Southern Airways. Their analysis showed that increasing returns to scale
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was probably one of the major incentives for airline merging.
Hviid and Prendergast [5] were interested in the bidding game
of airline merging. They assumed that the target airline had
private information of its own profits, and both the target and
the bidder airlines played the Cournot game in a duopolistic
market before merging took place. In the equilibrium, the
bidder’s offer would be rejected only if the operating costs of
the target airline were lower than the bidder’s expectation.
Youssef and Hansen [19] found that code-sharing agreement
between Swissair and Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) had
produced higher load factor resulted from better quality of
service for customers. Oum et al. [11] developed an analytical
procedure for the impact assessment of code sharing between
follower and leader airlines. They found that if the follower
airlines formed a code-sharing alliance, the leader airline would
have to lower airfares in response to the new alliance. In the
equilibrium, the leader would have higher load factor due to
lower airfares. Furthermore, Park [13] pointed out that code
sharing could result in higher consumer’s surplus if airlines in
the same alliance had similar quality of service with low flight
frequency on their routes. Chen [4] studied the merging of
China Airline (CAL) and Formosa Airline by analyzing financial data to explore the relationship among bidding prices, financial stability, and profitability. Ko [8] predicted airline’s
benefits from parallel code sharing cooperation by using travelers’ revealed and stated preference data in discrete choice
demand modeling. He then applied cooperative game approach to solve the benefit distribution problem of domestic
airlines. Agusdinata and de Klein [1] explained the dynamic of
airline alliances. Using a system of dynamic approach they
described the driving forces behind the formation of alliances
internally and externally. Their paper aimed at solutions not
only for airlines that are looking for an appropriate alliance
group but also for established groups looking for new members.
Suen [16] argued that Swissair Group’s bankruptcy is a direct
consequence of mistakes made in implementing its alliance
strategy. While the strategy was sound, her analysis showed
that Swissair did not need equity to bind its partners to it. Her
approach suggested that the alliance strategy undermined a
corporate goal to diversify risk beyond the airline business.
Financial analysis showed that airline investment was unprofitable which increased the Group’s leverage and weakened its
cash position. As a result, the Group did not have adequate
resources to recover from external shocks. Although global
airline alliances in the 1980s gave rise to concerns that increased monopoly power of major carriers would lead to large
and sustained producer surpluses, Morrish and Hamilton [10]
examined 15 years of alliance experience and found no conclusive evidence that alliance membership had yielded monopoly profits to the airlines. They found that airline alliances
had improved load factors and productivity and yet only produced modest gains to the carriers due to fare restrictions.
Shyr and Chang [15], following Ko’s approach, compared the
customer’s surplus before and after international airline’s
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complementary code sharing. Iatrou and Alamdari [7] addressed the perceived impacts of alliances based on a comprehensive survey of the alliance management department. They
evaluated the impacts of traffic, load factors, costs, revenues
and fares resulted from various forms of alliances. Their
analysis showed that each of the four global alliances groupings
has experienced different results according to the type of collaboration agreed amongst their member airlines.
As for the applications of decision theory, Pen [14] integrated
the theory of competitiveness and Multiple Attribute Decision
Making to establish a model comparing airline competitiveness
between the year 1992 and 1997. Pen defined the components
of competitiveness index as management ability, price competitiveness, service quality, productivity, and cost competitiveness. Using Entropy method for Weighted Product Method
(WPM) and TOPSIS methods, Pen concluded that service
quality and management ability are two critical indices that are
highly related to airline’s competitiveness and profitability.
This study applies TOPSIS method to analyze managers’
preferences on code sharing and merging for two reasons: 1)
TOPSIS is derived from managers’ judgments and is effective
in many empirical works; 2) with managers’ judgments data, we
are able to calibrate the priority ranking of various coalition
alternatives regarding merging or code sharing.
II.

FORMULATION OF AIRLINE’S PAYOFF FUNCTION

1. Assumptions
The assumptions of the study are as follows:
1) All domestic airlines are candidates of targets or bidders in
the merging games;
2) Code sharing or merging is subject to super-additive assumptions;
3) Decision regarding code sharing or merging is rational;
4) All domestic airfares are restricted to upper limits set by civil
aviation authority to maximize social welfares.
The first assumption addresses the fact that all domestic airlines would not give up any good opportunities in the merging
games. The second assumption states that airlines would consider code sharing or merging as their feasible options only if
they could benefit from these practices, which is the super-additive assumption of cooperative games. The third assumption describes the fact that the practices of code sharing or
merging should be driven by the motivation of profit maximization. The last assumption reveals the fact that in many
countries domestic airfares are often restricted to upper limits
which lead to the maximization of social welfares – the sum of
consumer surplus and producer surplus, set by the policy makers of transport authorities.
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2. Payoff Functions

service route of the (i, j) O-D pair, Fijl is the flight frequency of
opponent airline l on the service route of the (i, j) O-D pair, FFk
The payoff function that could be used for various coalition is the variable of frequent flyer membership, 1 for the scenario
relationships consists of an air travel demand function of any that all passenger are the members of airline k, and 0 otherwise.
O-D pair, an airline’s load factor function, and a cost function FTijk is the flight time of airline k on the service route of the (i, j)
that could reveal different cooperation scenarios. The speci- O-D pair, FTijl is the flight time of opponent airline l on the
fication of payoff function is as follows:
service route of the (i, j) O-D pair, D1k is the seasonal adjustment factor of airline k, 1 for the scenario that the flight de(1) parting time is in January, February, April, July, August, Deπ ijk = pijk ⋅ qijk − cos tijk ⋅ Fijk
cember, which are often the months with peak demand, and 0
Where πijk is the profit of airline alliance k generated from the (i, for other months. D2k is the accident adjustment factor of airline
j) O-D pair, pijk is the average airfare set by airline alliance k on alliance k, 1 for the scenario of the air travel demand after acthe service route of the (i, j) O-D pair, qijk is the air travel de- cidents with high fatality and casualty in the following four
mand of airline alliance k on the service route of the (i, j) O-D months － assuming the negative impacts of major accidents
pair, Costijk is the cost per flight of airline alliance k on the would last for four months, and 0 otherwise. β’s is the coeffiservice route of the (i, j) O-D pair, Fijk is the flight frequency of cients of the logistic regression function, and e is the random
airline alliance k on the service route of the (i, j) O-D pair.
error.

3. Demand and Load Factors

The air travel demand qijk is formulated as follows:
qijk = Qij ⋅ Sijk = Fijk ⋅ Seatsijk ⋅ Rijk
Rijk =

Qij ⋅ Sijk
Fijk ⋅ Seatijk

Sijk =

=

(2)

1
1+ e

(3)

− fijk

1

(4)

1+ ∑ e

Vijl −Vijk

Because the load factors of airline alliances under various
scenarios could not be observed in current practices, we would
have to collect survey data of passenger's revealed and stated
preferences on airlines. In other words, the load factor function was estimated by using potential demand predicted by the
passengers' choice model under various scenarios. Meanwhile,
using monthly airlines’ load factor data in the past five years, we
were able to validate the load factor function with data combination techniques.

4. Costs

l ≠k

Where, Seatijk is the number of seats per flight of airline alliance
k of the (i, j) O-D pair, Rijk is the load factor of airline alliance k
of the (i, j) O-D pair, Sijk is the market share of airline alliance k
of the (i, j) O-D pair, Vijk is the utility function of passengers
choosing airline alliance k of the (i, j) O-D pair, fijk is the function with attributes related to load factor of airline alliance k of
the (i, j) O-D pair.
The specification of load factor as a logistic function ensures
that the value of load factor would lie between 0 and 1. The
utility function of passenger's choice of airline was set to be a
linear function of airfares, frequencies, and seasonal adjustment
factors. In addition, the load factor model could be calibrated
by linear regression approach with the following transformation:

− ln(

1
− 1) = U ijk
Rijk

(5)

= β 0 k + β1k pijk + ∑ β1l pijl + β 2 k ln Fijk + ∑ β 2l ⋅ ln Fijl
l ≠k

The cost function consisted of four parts: 1) direct flight costs,
i.e., fuel costs; 2) airport holding costs, i.e., landing and holding
fees, passengers and cargos logistic costs; 3) variable costs, i.e.,
passenger service and crew costs; and 4) other costs, i.e.,
maintenance and leasing costs. It should be noted that the
costs vary from code sharing to merging. For instance, code
sharing would affect cargo logistic costs, passenger service
costs, etc.; merging, on the other hand, would affect crew costs,
maintenance and leasing costs if two merging airline reschedule
their crews and flights.

III. SOLUTION APPROACH
The solution approach consists of four steps: 1) calibrating
market shares and estimating payoffs for various carriers; and 2)
solving optimal fare rates and daily service frequency under
Nash equilibrium; and 3) solving profit distribution problem by
using Shapley values; and 4) applying TOPSIS to assess the
ranking of factors affecting airlines’ merging and the ranking of
all coalition alternatives.

l≠k

+ β 3 k FFk + β 4 k FTijk + ∑ β 4l FTijl + β 5 k D1k + β 6 k D2 k + e

1. Calibration of Payoffs for Various Coalition Strategies

l ≠k

The calibration begins with the questionnaire survey on
Where, pijl is the average airfare set by opponent airline l on the
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travelers’ preference on choices of airlines under various scenarios. The survey is conducted by general stratified sampling,
i.e., the sample should be drawn in proportion to the market
shares. The market share model includes all the attributes
related to the quality of services and airfares. The functional
form of the utility function is usually assumed to be linear. In
addition, alternative-specific constants are often specified in the
utility function to reveal qualitative characteristics of the services provided by the carriers.

2. Solution Approach of Nash Equilibrium
The solution of Nash Equilibrium is derived from the following procedures: 1) finding the upper bound airfares that
satisfy maximum social welfare as shown in Equation (6); and
2) solving the system of maximization problems for all competitors as shown in Equation (7). Equation (6) satisfies the
fourth assumption while Equation (7) satisfies the third assumption.

max
P

∑∑∑ π ijk (P) + CSijk (P) , CSijk (P) = ∫
i

j

WPijk

Pijk

k

qijk ( P )dPijk ,

Pijk ≥ 0 , ∀i, j, k

(6)

max π ijk (P) subject to 0 ≤ Pijk ≤ Pijk ∀i, j, k

(7)

P

Where, CS ( ) = the consumer surplus, as a function of airfares,
Pijk = the upper bound airfare of airline alliance k set by the
authority for (i, j) OD pair, P = the set of airfares for (i, j) OD
pair.
Both Equations (7) and (8) require techniques of non-linear
optimization and their first order conditions, as shown in
Equations (8) and (9), may have multiple solutions. By applying the computer software named MATHEMATICA [18],
we can find feasible solutions of Equations (8) and (9).
∂
∂Pijk
∂ π ijk
∂ Pijk

∑∑∑ ⎡⎣π
i

j

k

ijk

(P) + CSijk (P) ⎤⎦ = 0 , ∀i, j , k

= 0 subject to

Pijk + s ijk = Pijk

(8)

sijk ≥ 0 ∀i, j, k (9)

Another alternative to solve Equation (6) and (7) is to apply the
first order Taylor series to the predicted daily revenue passengers q as shown in Equation (10) such that the objective functions in Equations (6) and (7) can be approximated as quadratic
functions of airfares and Equations (8) and (9) can be transformed into systems of linear equations.

qijk (P) ≅ qijk (P0 ) + (P − P0 )'

∂qijk (P )
∂P

|P =P0

11

(10)

In the case study, we use the fare rates in 2004 for all competing carriers as the vector of P0 applied to Equation (10).

3. Solution Approach of Cooperative Games
To evaluate the contributions of allied members in the cooperative games, we propose the following procedures based on
Owen [12].
Step I: List all coalition structures.
A coalition structure is defined as a partition of all players in
the cooperative game. For example, if five airlines are forming
various alliances, their coalition structures will be S = {1}
versus N-S = {2, 3, 4, 5}, S = {3, 4} versus N-S = {1, 2, 5}, etc.
As a result, there will be 2N-1 coalition structures.
Step II: Calibrate the payoff functions of all coalition structures.
The payoff functions are calibrated by using the same model
as in the non-cooperative game, but the data is collected from
travelers’ stated preference regarding their new choices of carriers if new alliances among airlines were developed.
Step III: Solve the market equilibrium under all coalition
structures.
Based on the assumption of efficiency, a solution of the following systems of equations yields the maximum profit and the
optimal fare rates to each coalition structure under market
equilibrium, as shown in Equation (11).
⎧ ∂π S
⎫
⎪ ∂P = 0 ⎪
⎪
⎪
S
⎨
⎬ ∀S ⊂ N
π
∂
−
N
S
⎪
= 0⎪
⎪⎩ ∂PN − S
⎪⎭

(11)

Similarly, Equation (11) could be solved by the technique of
Taylor series approximation.
Step IV: Apply software MATHEMATICA to solve the Shapley
value.
Given the payoffs derived from Step III, we could apply
MATHEMATICA to compute the Shapley value and solve the
profit distribution problem in the case study.
The solution concept of Shapley value is based on the
evaluation of the marginal contribution of each member under
various coalition scenarios. The formula of Shapley values is
as follows:
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ϕi [ v ] =

∑

( t − 1)!( n − t )! ⎡

⎤
⎣ v (T ) − v (T − {i} ) ⎦

n!

T ⊂N
i∈T

(12)

Step 3: Computation of Separation Measure
If the ideal solution is positive for utility indices, then

Si+ =
where ϕi [ v ] is the Shapley value of player i, v(T ) is the

∑ (V
n

ij

j =1

− V j*

)

2

, i = 1, 2,....., m

(17)

payoff of coalition T including player i, v(T − {i}) is the payoff
of coalition T excluding player i, n is the number of players in
the cooperative game, and t is the number of players in coalition
T.

If the ideal solution is negative for cost indices, then

4. Alternative Rankings by TOPSIS

Step 4: Calculation of Relative Closeness (RC) for various
factors or alternatives

Next, TOPSIS was adopted to assess the rankings of factors
affecting airlines’ merging. These factors included profitability, financial stability, complementary with service network,
compatibility with maintenance and logistic systems, and coordination of human resources. A set of weights for theses
factors was derived based on the preferences of airline managers. The results were then applied to evaluate various coalition
strategies among airlines. The solution approach to TOPSIS is
as follows:
Step 1: Normalization of indices

X ij =

(X

(X

ij

− X min . j

max . j

)

− X min . j

Vij = W j × X ij

(13)

)

, j = 1,2, " n

(14)

where Xij is the jth index value for the ith alternative,
X max . j = max{X ij , ∀i} , X min . j = min X ij , ∀i . X ij is the normalized index, lies between 0 and 1. Vij is the weighted normalized index value, lies between 0 and 1, and Wj is the
weights.

{

}

Step 2: Calculation of ideal solutions and negative ideal solutions

A* =

{( max V

ij

i

)(

{

= V1* , V2* ,"V j* ,"Vn*

A− =

{( min V
i

{

ij

)

}

(15)

)

}

(16)

j ∈ B , min Vij j ∈ C i = 1, 2," m
i

}

)(

j ∈ B , max Vij j ∈ C i = 1, 2," m

= V1− , V2− ,"V j− ,"Vn−

i

}

where B is the set of utility indices and C is the set of cost indices, A* and A− are the positive and negative ideal solutions,
respectively.

Si− =

∑ (V
n

ij

j =1

RCi =

− V j−

)

2

Si−
S + Si+
−
i

, i = 1, 2,....., m

0 ≤ RCi ≤ 1

(18)

(19)

If Ai = A* , then RCi* = 1 ; if Ai = A− , then RCi* = 0 .
Step 5: Creation of priority ranking for various factors or alternatives
From Step 4, we could find the RC values for various factors
and coalition alternatives. By ranking the RC’s in descending
order, we are able to create a priority list of different alternatives
for airline coalitions.

IV.

CASE STUDY

For the study of code sharing effects, we selected four destinations, i.e., Bangkok, San Francisco, Sydney, and Amsterdam as shown in Figure 1, for international travelers originated
or transferred from Taipei. As for merging, we focused on the
assessment of various merging alternatives among domestic
airlines－because TCAB would not approve of the merging
between Taiwanese and foreign airlines.
The survey data consist of two parts: 1) travelers’ stated and
revealed preferences, and 2) managers’ preferences on merging
among domestic airlines. Random sampling was performed at
the waiting lines of airport counters for travelers flying from
Taipei to four selected destinations. Our sample is consistent
with the market shares of airlines serving these routes. Figure
1 shows the airlines that are flying these routes. Currently,
Qantas and EVA have code sharing agreement in flying between
Taipei and Sydney.
As for the survey design of managers’ preferences toward
coalitions, our questionnaires provided information regarding
estimation of profitability, complementary of service network,
and financial conditions under all merging scenarios. In addition, managers were asked to evaluate the compatibility of
maintenance and logistic systems, and coordination of human
resources before and after coalitions. With information of
these five factors, i.e., three evaluated by the questionnaires and
two evaluated by themselves, managers were then asked to give
their preferences on and their priority on various coalition
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Table 2. Model parameters of airline’s load factor from Taipei to AmCAL
EVA
KLM

CAL

sterdam: the case of code sharing between CAL and KLM (t

EVA

values in parentheses).

United

Amsterdam

San Francisco

Constant

Taipei
Bangkok

CAL

CAL

EVA

EVA/

KLM

Qantas

Sydney

Thai
Swissair
Figure 1. Airlines flying from Taipei to various destinations in the case
study.

Table 1. Model parameters of airline’s load factor from Taipei to Amsterdam before coalition (t values in parentheses).

Airline
Variables
Constant
Airfare (CAL)
Airfare (EVA)
Airfare (KLM)
Frequency
(CAL)
Frequency
(EVA)
Frequency
(KLM)
Membership
(CAL)
Membership
(EVA)
Membership
(KLM)
Seasonal Factor: D1
Accident Factor: D2
2
Adjusted R
F Value

CAL

EVA

KLM

7.799
（6.476）
-2.354
（-10.041）
0.532
（3.985）
1.137
（5.805）
0.542
（1.250）
-1.663
（-4.016）
-2.900
（-6.821）
5.486
（7.369）
-0.421
（-0.557）
-1.348
（-1.286）
-1.329
（-3.407）
-0.481
（-0.850）
0.710
501.713

12.280
（11.823）
0.695
（3.435）
-1.736
（-15.086）
0.969
（5.738）
-3.872
（-10.353）
1.684
（4.715）
-3.494
（-9.528）
-1.459
（-1.615）
4.656
（7.141）
-1.459
（-1.615）
-0.201
（-0.596）
-0.444
（-0.909）
0.903
226.250

12.997
（14.200）
0.667
（3.741）
0.274
（2.702）
-2.107
（-14.154）
-3.337
（-10.125）
-1.498
（-4.757）
0.555
（1.716）
-1.613
（-2.851）
-1.112
（-1.936）
5.878
（7.381）
0.09463
（0.319）
-0.565
（-1.314）
0.904
90.229

Note: 33 New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) = 1 US Dollar (USD). Airfares
are recorded in 1000 NTD and frequencies are recorded in
flights per week.

Airline
Variables

Airfare
(CAL)
Airfare
(EVA)
Airfare
(KLM)
Frequency
(CAL)
Frequency
(EVA)
Frequency
(KLM)
Flight time
(CAL)
Flight time
(EVA)
Flight time
(KLM)
Adjusted R
F Value

2

CAL

EVA

KLM

8.337
（2.404）
-2.670
（-5.416）
0.385
（1.872）
0.858
（1.869）
1.855
（3.422）
-1.178
（-2.399）
-2.328
（-4.378）
-0.442
（-3.972）
0.114
（1.023）
0.206
（1.848）

5.440
（1.954）
0.290
（1.732）
-1.451
（-3.937）
0.251
（1.708）
-0.872
（-2.005）
0.178
（1.417）
-0.917
（-2.326）
0.242
（2.703）
-0.312
（-3.486）
0.162
（1.819）

16.541
（7.337）
0.847
（2.644）
1.290
（4.324）
-2.362
（-8.228）
-2.416
（-6.857）
-3.023
（-8.745）
-1.347
（-4.223）
0.329
（4.544）
0.203
（2.808）
-0.765
（-10.581）

0.769

0.742

0.935

10.622

5.452

42.810

Note: flight time is recorded in hours.

alternatives.

1. Calibration of Load Factors and Costs for Various
Coalitions
Given the fact that historical load factor data for most of the
code sharing and merging cases were unavailable, we apply
travelers’ stated preference data to calibrate airline’s market
share as multinomial Logit models. Then, we produce the
stated preference load factor data with the prediction drawn
from the stated-preference market share models. By applying
data combination technique [2] to the stated preference and the
revealed preference load factor data – the historical data, we
produce the results of model calibration as shown in Table 1.
In the paper, we only present the estimated results based on
the travel data from Taipei to Amsterdam. Detail results could
be found in the theses written by Kuo [9], Shyr and Chang [15].
Table 2 shows the estimation results for the code sharing between CAL and KLM. Table 3 shows the results for the
merging of CAL and EVA.
Except for the insignificant signs of seasonal factor, most of
the estimated parameters are consistent with our a priori. For
instance, the signs for airfares, opponents’ frequency, and ac-
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Table 3. Model parameters of airline’s load factor from Taipei to Amsterdam: the case of merging between CAL and EVA (t values in
parentheses).

Airline
Variables
Constant
Airfare
(CAL/EVA)
Airfare
(KLM)
Frequency
(CAL/EVA)
Frequency
(KLM)
Adjusted R
F Value

2

CAL and EVA

KLM

7.258
（4.025）
-1.078
（-3.595）
0.127
（1.347）
-1.425
（-3.623）
-1.326
（-3.929）

11.077
（2.222）
1.641
（1.979）
-2.124
（-2.102）
-4.346
（-3.998）
-1.876
（-2.010）

0.824

0.778

10.394

8.007

cident are negative in both Table 2 and Table 3; and the signs of
frequency and opponents’ airfares are positive in Table 2. To
explain why the signs of frequency in Table 3 are negative, we
need to verify that the demand of air travel has a property of
decreasing returns of scales.
Judging from the magnitudes of the parameters shown in
Table 2, we find that airline’s flight frequency has positive but
smaller effects on its own load factor, while it has negative but
larger effects on its opponent’s load factor. If one airline
merged with one of its opponents, the load factor of the merged
airline would decrease as flight frequency increases resulted
from merging. In conclusion, the calibrated results are consistent with the property of decreasing returns of scales.
As for the calibration of cost functions, we used Boeing
747-400 as an example for the demonstration. Table 4 shows the
total operating costs per flight from Taipei to four destinations
in the pre-coalition case based upon the data provided by Tseng
[17]. We further assume that the estimated operating costs per
flight remain the same before and after code sharing while the
costs per flight are deducted 15% after merging because we
assume that merging could save some indirect operation costs,
i.e., management cost, advertisement cost, promotion costs, etc.
The assumption of cost reduction is based on the fact that the
information regarding merging are often very confidential and
it may vary from one case to another, depending on the number of lay-off workers. Therefore, our best guess of cost reduction would be the ratio of indirect operation costs to the total
operation costs.

2. Case of International Airlines - Assessment of Code
Sharing
In the following sections, we present the cases of parallel and
complementary code sharing between Taiwanese and Foreign

Table 4. Estimated operating costs for each flight from Taipei to four
destinations.

Destination
Amsterdam
Category
Direct Flight
9436.16
Distance (km)
Fuel Costs
1,594,573
$NTD
Holding Costs
378,703
$NTD
Other Costs
393,844
$NTD
Total $NTD 2,090,036

San Francisco

Sydney

Bangkok

10384.25

7280.52

2487.53

1,359,918

1,145,968

309,131

325,227

310,781

259,490

330,077

325,227

116,760

2,015,222

2,781,976

685,381

Table 5. Optimal airfares, load factors, and weekly profits before coalition.

Origin/
Weekly Airfares Load Weekly Profits
Airlines
Destination
Flights in $NTD Factor
in $NTD
CAL
Taipei/
EVA
Amsterdam
KLM

7

36,724

69%

47,802,675

4

38,048

70%

28,681,838

7

39,634

77%

57,599,006

CAL

3

27,260

85%

12,058,972

EVA

2

20,860

88%

7,919,348

QAN

2

22,832

88%

9,286,548

Taipei/
Sydney

airlines on four international routes, i.e., from Taipei to Sydney,
Bangkok, San Francisco, and Amsterdam. For the cases of
parallel code sharing, i.e., allied airlines flying on the same
routes, travel demands and estimated profits were evaluated
based on one way trips from Taipei to Sydney and to Amsterdam. For the case of complementary code sharing, i.e., allied
airlines providing transfer connections on separate routes, travel
demands and estimated profits were evaluated based on one
way trips from Taipei to Bangkok and to San Francisco, plus the
transfer trips from Bangkok to San Francisco.

1) Payoffs for Parallel Code Sharing
Based on the estimated costs as shown in Table 4 and the
calibrated load factor model as shown in Table 1, Table 2, and
Table 3, we apply software Mathematica (Varian [18]) to solve
the optimal airfares in the Bertrand games. The results before
and after various coalition cases for flights from Taipei to Amsterdam and to Sydney are shown in Table 5 and Table 6.
In Table 6, all the cases of code sharing were evaluated based
on transfer time within two hours. In comparison of these
Tables, we find that for the allied members, their load factors
are higher and their airfares are lower in the case of merging
between CAL and EVA and the cases of code sharing among
airlines than the cases before coalition. The results are consistent with Park’s findings [13]. In addition, according to
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Table 6. Optimal airfares, load factors, and weekly profits after coalition.
Scenario

Airlines

in
$NTD

CAL/EVA

Parallel
Code

CAL/KLM

Amsterdam Sharing

EVA/KLM

Merging CAL/EVA

CAL/EVA

Parallel
Code
Sydney

Table 7. Optimal airfares in Bertrand game: the case of complementary
code sharing from Bangkok to San Francisco.

Airfares
Destination

15

CAL/QAN

Sharing

EVA/QAN

Load
Factor

Weekly
Profits in
$NTD

CAL

27,905 87% 47,501,900

EVA

30,035 85% 53,916,300

KLM

25,535 74% 37,024,600

CAL

26,406 86% 42,969,477

EVA

24,769 72% 19,240,338

KLM

30,801 86% 49,923,309

CAL

43,519 91% 83,032,700

EVA

41,420 91% 74,156,300

KLM

31,288 87% 53,502,900

CAL/EVA 32,558 72% 72,856,154
KLM

30,279 85% 48,410,644

CAL

33,217 79% 14,714,672

EVA

24,215 78% 8,353,648

QAN

28,074 83% 11,699,248

CAL

38,637 79% 18,266,672

EVA

24,249 73% 7,428,148

QAN

24,959 72% 7,702,448

CAL

30,500 79% 12,838,072

EVA

22,151 74% 6,517,348

QAN

26,960 82% 10,846,448

CAL/EVA 32,168 70% 32,666,100
Merging CAL/EVA
QAN

Transfer
Airlines

29,910 85% 12,531,700

Table 6 we found that the profit of code sharing between KLM
and CAL is less than the profit of KLM profit plus the profit of
CAL before coalition. Similarly, the profit of merging between
CAL and EVA is also less than the profit of EVA plus the profit
of CAL before coalition. In other words, the estimated profits
did not increase because of code sharing or merging. Unless
the costs could be significantly reduced in cases of code sharing
or merging, airlines flying from Taipei to Amsterdam would
have no incentive for code sharing or merging.

2) Payoffs for Complementary Code Sharing
As to complementary code sharing, currently both CAL and
EVA provide direct services from Bangkok to San Francisco
with transfer at Taipei. To provide the same services, United
Airline must be code sharing with Thai Airways, KLM, or
Swissair. In this case, we assume that all these six airlines are
the players of the game, and United Airline could be simultaneously code sharing with more than one airline in competing
with CAL and EVA. Table 7 shows the estimated profits and

Time in
Hours

Airfares in Market
$NTD

Share %

Weekly

Consumers’

Profits in

Surplus in

$NTD

$NTD/week

CAL

0.83

18,053

12%

2,579,927

18,138

EVA

1.5

16,891

9%

1,440,495

13,022

United-Thai

1.5

18,312

8%

2,023,385

13,961

United-KLM

0.67

11,977

36%

3,772,755

31,651

United-Swissair

1

11,574

35%

3,450,132

29,739

optimal airfares for complementary code sharing of flights from
Bangkok to San Francisco.
The computation of Shapley values were derived from the
following coalition structures:
1) Players: CAL (C), EVA (E), United (U), Thai (T), KLM (K),
and Swissair (S);
2) Dummy Coalitions: no complementary code sharing could
be formed by the members, for example, {C, E}, {T, K, S},
etc.; in these cases, the payoffs are zeros.
3) Effective Coalitions: complementary code sharing could be
formed by the members, for example, {U, T}, {U, K, S},
{U, T, K, S}, etc.; in these cases, the payoffs are the profits
of code sharing between United Airline and other airlines
except CAL and EVA.
4) Hybrid Coalitions: complementary code sharing could be
formed by part of the members, for example, {C, U, T}, {E,
U, K}, etc.; in these cases, CAL and EVA are dummy
members in the coalitions.
Table 7 provides the estimated payoff of {U, T, K, S}, while
the estimated payoffs of other coalitions could be found in the
paper written by Shyr and Chang [15]. From Table 7, we learn
that the code sharing among United Airline, Thai Airways,
KLM, and Swissair would decrease the market shares of CAL
and EVA significantly. In most cases, the code sharing of
United and the other airlines could provide lower airfares with
less transfer time to attract passengers flying from Bangkok to
San Francisco who are used to choose the direct flight services
provided by CAL and EVA.
By applying software MATHEMATICA, we compute the
Shapley values for six players as shown in Table 8. In other
words, Table 8 provides the profit distributions of complementary code sharing among United Airline, Thai Airways,
KLM, and Swissair.
By applying software MATHEMATICA, we compute the
Shapley values for six players as shown in Table 8. In other
words, Table 8 provides the profit distributions of complementary code sharing among United Airline, Thai Airways,
KLM, and Swissair.
If United Airline is allowed to code sharing with one airline
only, then the profit split could be derived from Table 7 to
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Table 8. Shapley values of code sharing for Bangkok-San Francisco

Table 11. Financial data for Taiwan’s major airlines.

flights.

Airlines
Category

Airline

CAL EVA United Thai

Shapley Values
% Share

KLM Swissair

0

0 223,643 16,466 148,991 5,051

0

0 56.74% 4.18% 37.80% 1.28%

Before

After

Change United Thai KLM Swissair
0

0

United-KLM 3,592,350 3,986,500 +394,150 236,556 0 157,594

69.89

74.00

71.26

66.02

84.88

105.13 137.00 136.45 89.12

83.29

Current Ratio 78.22 74.00 102.10 32.31

56.88

Long Term

Structure

Capital and
Fixed Asset

4,413,320 4,473,930 +60,610 59,271

0

0

Liquidity
Ratio

Quick Ratio

44.88 38.00

67.98

20.09

21.28

9

NA

0.54*

0.82*

NA

34.46

18.99

26.25

NA

10.59

19.23

14

0.84

0.64

0.90

0.63

0.47

0.46

0.41

0.59

0.33

3.38

NA

5.08*

2.04*

5.82*

TimesInterest-

140.15

Earned

0

Account Receivable Turn- 12.59

1,339

over Rate

Table 10. The estimated profits before and after code sharing or merging.

Airlines
Airlines
CAL

EVA

UNA

Financial

Profit Splits ($NTD)

United-Thai 1,805,930 1,905,030 +129,100 120,247 8,853

CAL

TRA

Ratio
Profits ($NTD)

Swissair

FAT

Ratio

cisco flights.

United-

EVA

Debt Asset

Table 9. Effects of code sharing and profit splits for Bangkok-San Fran-

Scenarios

CAL

EVA

1,325,142 199,010
19,223,718 2,136,313

FAT

TRA

UNA

－

－

－

－

－

Average ColAsset Man- lection Period 28.99
agement
(days)
Ratio
Fixed Asset
0.60
Turnover Ratio
Total Asset
Turnover Ratio

－

Return on

FAT

－

－

1,330,104 2,264,967 3,239,363

Assets

TRA

－

－

5,234,160 806,657 2,659,184

UNA

Return on
Equity

－

－

7,245,740 5,550,520 1,725,899

Profitability Basic Earning
Ratio
Power Ratio

produce the profit splits as shown in Table 9. From Table 7,
Table 8, and Table 9, we learned that the code sharing between
United Airline and KLM would generate not only the maximum
profits but also the largest consumers’ surplus among all scenarios. As a result, United Airline and KLM have the largest
Shapley values as well as the largest shares of coalition profits.

Profit Margin
on Sales
Earnings per
Share ($NTD)
Cash Flow
Ratio
Cash Flow

3) Case of Domestic Airlines - Priority Ranking of Coalitions by TOPSIS

Management

Cash Flow

6.77

15.0* 21.28* 9.49* 168.95*

2.55

6.00* 19.24* 10.1*

30.26*

0.74

1.44*

2.12*

1.08*

15.39*

23.90

2.00

106.57

3.33

8.22*

16.79

43.00

19.10

8.64

35.04*

2.34

NA

6.88

1.32

5.79*

3.28

125.16

NA

NA

3.09*

4.31* 0.10*

NA

NA

0.48

Ratio
vestment Ratio

Leverage

10.0* 23.64* 20.03* 95.07*

Affordable

Cash Rein-

As mentioned above, merging between domestic Airlines and
foreign Airlines is not allowed in Taiwan, so we could only
show the merging of domestic airlines in the case study. Table
10 shows the estimated profit changes after code sharing and
merging from sample routes for five Taiwanese airlines, i.e.,
China Airlines (CAL), EVA Air (EVA), Far Eastern Air Transport (FAT), Trans Asia Airways (TRA), and UNI Air (UNA).
In Table 10, figures in the diagonal section represent the profits
before code sharing, figures in the upper triangular area are the
additional profits derived from code sharing, and figures in the
lower triangular area are the additional profits derived from
merging. The estimations of profit changes are based on the
calibration results provided by Kuo [9]. Currently, CAL and
EVA provide international services while FAT, TRA, and UNA

4.09

Operating
Leverage
Financial Leverage

Note: NA for Not Available; figures shown in (*) are estimated values.

fly to most of the domestic destinations with very limited international services. With limited coalition information provided by sample routes, we learned that code sharing between
FAT and UNA might be the best choice among all code sharing
alternatives while merging of CAL and EVA could produce the
largest profits in all coalition alternatives. In addition, Table
10 shows that airlines would produce more profits in all cases of
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Table 12. Ranking of merging preferences.

Target \ Bidder

CAL

FAT

CAL

NA

2

EVA

1

1

FAT

4

NA

TRA

3

4

UNA

2

3

tives are shown in Table 13. From Table 13 we learn that: 1)
code sharing would be less attractive than merging for FAT,
TRA, and UNA; 2) FAT is the best target for TRA and UNA in
the merging games; 3) the worst alternative would be no coalition with any other airlines. In other words, all the domestic
airlines are willing to merge or be merged to enhance their
market shares and profitability in the highly competitive market.

V.

Table 13. Ranking of domestic airline’s preferences on coalition alterna-
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CONCLUSION

The major findings of our paper are summarized as follows:

tives.

1) Our analysis suggests that merging of CAL and EVA or
code sharing among airlines would result in lower airfares
and higher load factors for all airlines flying from Taipei to
No Coalition
5
5
5
Amsterdam and to Sydney. The results are consistent with
Park’s findings which suggest that international flights may
Code Sharing with FAT
3
3
not benefit from parallel code sharing unless the costs
Code Sharing with TRA
3
4
could be significantly reduced.
2)
The complementary code sharing between United Airline
Code Sharing with UNI
3
4
and KLM may produce not only the maximum profits but
Merging with FAT
1
1
also the largest consumer surplus due to lower airfares and
less transfer time. In other words, for passengers flying
Merging with TRA
1
2
from Bangkok to San Francisco, the code sharing of United
Merging with UNA
2
2
and KLM is very attractive in comparison with the direct
flight services provided by CAL and EVA. As a result, the
market shares of CAL and EVA would drop significantly
coalitions than the cases without coalition.
for flights between Bangkok and San Francisco.
Table 11 shows the financial performances of 2001 provided 3) By analyzing the Shapley Values of all airlines and the
by five domestic airlines. The financial data of CAL, EVA,
changes in consumer surplus, we are able to evaluate the
and FAT are provided by Taiwan Stock Exchange cooperation
impacts of strategic alliances and merging on both airlines
while the financial data of UNA and TRA are provided by
and passengers. And we find that airlines with the capaTCAB.
bility to produce the maximum profits among all coalition
From Table 11, we learn that earn per share (EPS) of CAL is
scenarios would have the highest Shapley values.
not the highest in Taiwan’s airline industry, but the stock ex- 4) Based on our TOPSIS analysis, we find that the most imchanging value of CAL is often the highest among the three.
portant factors affecting airline coalition are profitability
Because CAL has always been the largest airline in Taiwan, it
and financial credibility and stability. The results are
is often the bidder in the merging games.
consistent with the fact that CAL or EVA often plays as
From the weights of five factors affecting airline merging
bidder in the airline merging games.
calibrated by TOPSIS, we find that financial stability is the 5) If we assume that CAL and FAT are the bidders, their
major concern in merging decision, followed by profitability,
preferences on merging targets suggest that the best target
network coverage, maintenance compatibility, and human cofor CAL would be EVA, and its second choice would be
ordination. The results are consistent with the fact that CAL or
UNA. Likewise, the best target for FAT is EVA, and its
EVA often plays as bidder in the airline merging games.
second choice would be CAL. The choices are consistent
If we assume that CAL and FAT were the bidders, their
with the fact that CAL, EVA, and UNA have good perpreferences on merging targets are shown in Table 12. Based
formance on financial stability and profitability over the
on our analysis, we conclude that the best target for CAL would
past decade.
be EVA, and its second choice would be UNA. Likewise, the 6) Domestic Taiwanese airlines would gain more profits
best target for FAT is EVA, and its second choice would be CAL.
through merging rather than code sharing, and airlines
The choices are consistent with the fact that CAL, EVA, and
might produce more profits in all the cases of airline coaUNA have good performance on financial stability and profitlitions than the cases with no coalition.
ability over the past decade.
Alternative
\Airlines

Far Eastern
Air

Trans
Asia

Uni Air

For other domestic airlines, the ranking of coalition alterna-
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